Mr. McLane was, however, persuaded that there
was no obligation on either Government to acquiesce in the opinion of
the arbiter on any of the matters involved in his premises; that such
acquiescence would defeat the end of the present negotiation, and that
as it appeared to be mutually conceded that the arbiter had not been
able to decide upon the first and most material point so as to make a
binding decision, there could certainly be no greater obligation to
yield to his opinions on subordinate matters merely. The Secretary
further observed that the most material point of the three submitted
to the arbiter was that of the highlands, to which the President's
proposition directly applies, and which are designated in the treaty of
peace as the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, formed by a line drawn due
north from the source of the St. Croix River to the highlands dividing
the rivers, etc.; that the arbiter found it impossible to decide this
point, and therefore recommended a new line, different from that called
for by the treaty of 1783, and which could only be established by
a conventional arrangement between the two Governments; that the
Government of the United States could not adopt this recommendation
nor agree upon a new and conventional line without the consent of the
State of Maine; that the present negotiation proposed to ascertain the
boundary according to the treaty of 1783, and for this purpose, however
attained, the authority of the Government of the United States was
complete; that the proposition offered by the Government of the United
States promised, in the opinion of the President, the means of
ascertaining the true line by discovering the highlands of the treaty,
but the British Government asked the United States as a preliminary
concession to acquiesce in the opinion of the arbiter upon certain
subordinate facts--a concession which would in effect defeat the
sole object, not only of the proposition, but of the negotiation,
viz, the determination of the boundary according to the treaty of 1783
by confining the negotiation to a conventional line, to which this
Government had not the authority to agree.
Pages:
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410