It is thus that a concentrated money power is tempted to become an
active agent in political affairs; and all past experience has shown
on which side that influence will be arrayed. We deceive ourselves if
we suppose that it will ever be found asserting and supporting the
rights of the community at large in opposition to the claims of the few.
In a government whose distinguishing characteristic should be a
diffusion and equalization of its benefits and burdens the advantage of
individuals will be augmented at the expense of the community at large.
Nor is it the nature of combinations for the acquisition of legislative
influence to confine their interference to the single object for which
they were originally formed. The temptation to extend it to other
matters is, on the contrary, not unfrequently too strong to be resisted.
The rightful influence in the direction of public affairs of the mass
of the people is therefore in no slight danger of being sensibly and
injuriously affected by giving to a comparatively small but very
efficient class a direct and exclusive personal interest in so important
a portion of the legislation of Congress as that which relates to the
custody of the public moneys.
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