If the duty
imposed on the Postmaster-General by that law was to be regarded as
one of an official nature, belonging to his office as a branch of the
executive, then it is obvious that the constitutional competency of the
judiciary to direct and control him in its discharge was necessarily
drawn in question; and if the duty so imposed on the Postmaster-General
was to be considered as merely ministerial, and not executive, it yet
remained to be shown that the circuit court of this District had
authority to interfere by mandamus, such a power having never before
been asserted or claimed by that court. With a view to the settlement of
these important questions, the judgment of the circuit court was carried
by a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States. In the
opinion of that tribunal the duty imposed on the Postmaster-General was
not an official executive duty, but one of a merely ministerial nature.
The grave constitutional questions which had been discussed were
therefore excluded from the decision of the case, the court, indeed,
expressly admitting that with powers and duties properly belonging to
the executive no other department can interfere by the writ of mandamus;
and the question therefore resolved itself into this: Has Congress
conferred upon the circuit court of this District the power to issue
such a writ to an officer of the General Government commanding him to
perform a ministerial act? A majority of the court have decided that it
has, but have founded their decision upon a process of reasoning which
in my judgment renders further legislative provision indispensable to
the public interests and the equal administration of justice.
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